Jeanne Vallette d'Osia - Thesis abstract, Master in Development Economics (University of Göttingen and University of Clermont-Auvergne)
Abstract:
Especially in low and middle-income countries, the level of women’s empowerment, which is “the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them” (Kabeer, 1999), has a strong impact on family size. In turn, the degree of women’s property rights (PR), such as their legal access to property, land and inheritance compared to that of men’s, has a strong impact on their total empowerment. What are the mechanisms linking women’s PR to their fertility behaviors[1]? They appear to be mostly related to the increase at the household level in bargaining power women benefit from their access to asset ownership. The trade-off between ownership and fertility is highly related to the social and institutional environment in which women live. Overall, realized fertility rates decrease as far as women obtain more access to property and inheritance rights. On the contrary, due to families’ preference for male offspring in some countries, an increase of female decisional power at the household level can lead to a higher number of children.
Introduction:
The 5th Sustainable Development Goal adopted by the United Nations - “achieve gender equality and empower all women and and girls”[2]- is a core objective in human rights’ fight, but it is also fundamental in order to achieve long-term development outcomes.
Indeed, among the biggest obstacles preventing women from exercising their rights to property and inheritance there are pervasive discriminatory social attitudes and behaviors, which have been proven to lead to a decrease in gender equality and economic inefficiencies[3] . Morrison et al. (2007) illustrate the idea that reaching a state where access to rights and opportunities are independent of gender allows for a more sustainable and resilient development path, obtained through productivity gains and more inclusive institutions and policy choices.
The gender gap in economic well-being, social status, and empowerment is mostly explained by the gender gap in access to resources derived from land ownership (Chakrabarti, 2017). Mainly in developing countries, and specifically in rural areas, women often take care of the family’s assets while being denied the access to property and inheritance rights (United Nations, 1994). In rural India, less than 10% of women possess legal titles to land even though 70% of the agricultural active labor force is female (Bose and Das, 2020).
Women also face an additional burden in terms of their standard of living, which is manifested in the existence of a fertility gap, with the fertility gap being “the difference between the number of children women would like to have (fertility intentions) and the (final) fertility rate”.[4]As one of the main driver of demographic fluctuations, the decision of having children and the actual realization of doing so have strong implications for development, making reproductive rights (such as the number and spacing of children) human rights (United Nations, 2013).
Regarding reproductive decisions at the family level, Eguavoen et al. (2007) observed that for 65% of their 684 randomly selected households in Nigeria, “the man stands out as the traditional head of the home and therefore the decision maker including reproductive decisions.” (p°46). It is clear here that if women’s intrahousehold status would be improved, they would have more voice regarding decisions on family matters, such as the use of contraception or, for instance, the number or spacing of children.
Giulia Chersoni (Eurac Research Bolzano), Silvana Dalmazzone (Università di Torino), Elena Vallino (Università di Torino e OEET)[1]
Water, is taught by thirst. | Land – by the Oceans passed
(Emily Dickinson, Poems, 1896)
La voce dei paesi in via di sviluppo portata da Mia Mottley, Primo Ministro di Barbados, alla COP26 del 2021 ci fa riflettere sulle disuguaglianze nelle responsabilità e negli impatti dei
cambiamenti climatici fra nord e sud del mondo ma anche all’interno di paesi industrializzati fra fasce di reddito diverse. La Prima Ministra di Barbados, Mia Mottley, nel discorso di apertura della COP26 di Glasgow, UK (31 ottobre - 13 novembre 2021), aveva riassunto in pochi minuti diverse questioni estremamente complesse e rilevanti per le politiche relative al cambiamento climatico, con toni molto diretti. Aveva detto che gli impegni sulle politiche di mitigazione del cambiamento climatico sono encomiabili, ma non sufficienti, e anche che molti attori coinvolti basano i loro impegni su tecnologie che non esistono ancora, e ciò è come minimo imprudente, ma nel peggiore dei casi anche molto pericoloso. Aveva anche ricordato che la differenza di risorse economiche fra il livello necessario e quello stanziato per far fronte ai danni derivanti dal riscaldamento globale già in essere si misura in perdita di mezzi di sussistenza e di vite umane nei paesi piu’ poveri o piu’ vulnerabili. Questo è sia iniquo che profondamente immorale.
Vittorio Valli (Università di Torino e OEET)[1]
Alla fine del 2019 e nel 2020, dopo la diffusione della pandemia prima in Cina e poi via via in diversi paesi, tra cui l’Italia, non esistevano vaccini contro il COVID-19. La ricerca cominciò solo nei primi mesi del 2020. Era necessario quindi combattere la pandemia con altri mezzi. Ciò fu fatto in modi assai diversi.
In Cina, ma anche in Giappone, Corea del sud, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia e Nuova Zelanda, politiche restrittive assai dure di controllo alle frontiere, tracciamento ed isolamento laddove il virus si manifestasse permisero di ridurre fortemente la mortalità per COVID-19.[2]
In Occidente (Europa e America del Nord) ed in America Latina, politiche restrittive tardive, minore attenzione alle frontiere, più blande politiche di tracciamento ed isolamento, condussero nel 2020 a una mortalità assai più alta che nel primo gruppo di paesi. In rapporto alla popolazione, la mortalità per COVID-19 nei maggiori paesi dell’Occidente fu di oltre 300 volte più alta rispetto alla Cina e più di 30 volte rispetto a Giappone, Corea del sud, Taiwan, Australia e Nuova Zelanda.
In alcuni paesi emergenti, quali l’India, l’Indonesia e il Vietnam, restrizioni assai severe ed il relativamente basso numero di anziani permisero il contenimento della mortalità da COVID-19 per milione di abitanti. In India, un parziale herd effect (effetto gregge), interessando una larga fascia della popolazione e attivando gli anticorpi delle persone a-sintomatiche o guarite, aiutò ad attenuare per alcuni mesi la mortalità dopo l’ondata pandemica del luglio-ottobre 2020.
In diversi paesi poveri dell’Africa e dell’Asia, anche se spesso in assenza di buoni sistemi sanitari, due fattori importanti permisero di mitigare nettamente gli effetti sulla mortalità rispetto all’Occidente: gli assai minori contatti economici e migratori con la Cina e l’Occidente, che limitavano la diffusione del contagio, e l’assai più bassa età media della popolazione. Dato che la mortalità per COVID-19 era soprattutto concentrata fra gli ultra 60enni, essa ha colpito assai meno i paesi con relativamente pochi anziani.
Nel frattempo varianti sempre più insidiose e contagiose diventavano via via dominanti in gran parte del mondo: dal virus originario di Wuhan ed altre varianti minori, alla letale variante Alpha presente nel Regno Unito da fine 2020 e poi diffusasi in molti altri paesi.
Martina Magi (Laureata presso Università di Torino)
The global market is built upon transactions, these being carried out through money, assets or goods. Financial flows can be considered the main pillars of global economy. However, when we refer to global economy, we do not solely refer to legal and licit markets. The global market is also composed of grey areas, such as the so-called underground economy and criminal economy, where illicit activities and trades take place. The latter produce financial flows just like licit activities and trades do. When these flows cross state borders and, consequently, influence global economy they are renamed Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs), while similar flows at the national level would not be named “illicit” but “illegal”. In fact, while illegal financial flows are linked to activities which are classified as illegal by a national court or law, IFFs refer to activities which go against international rules and principles. Stating that a cross-border financial flow is illegal instead of illicit would be problematic as the definition of illegal depends on national laws and on the national perception of the phenomenon.
Vittorio Valli [1] (February 22, 2021)
ABSTRACT
If we look at the data on the Covid-19 deaths per million inhabitants we can see an immense gap between the West (Europe, US and Canada, Latin America) and Northern Eastern Asia. For example, as of 21 February 2021, the COVID-19 cumulative deaths per one million inhabitants in the major Western countries varied from 1883 in Belgium to 815 in Germany while they were 59 in Japan, 30 in South Korea, 3 in China and 0.4 in Taiwan. What are the main reasons of this enormous gap between the West and the three North-Eastern democratic Asian countries: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan? What are the main lessons that the extraordinary success of Taiwanese anti-covid-19 policies, the great one of South Korea and the substantial performance of Japan can give to Europe and the Americas? The answer is a mix of better policies and of deep demographic, cultural, institutional and historical differences. In the three Asian countries prevention was better than in Western countries and restrictive policies were prompter and more effective, even without the recourse to any generalized lockdown. Early severe screenings in ports and airports reduced the number of imported infections and well-organized tracing and isolation policies limited the diffusion of the pandemic avoiding the collapse of hospitals and other health institutions. Even though, up to now, the three Asian countries have done a relatively low number of tests (lower in Taiwan and Japan, somewhat higher in South Korea), the tests were much more prompt and targeted than in Europe or the Americas, and so the authorities were able, through careful tracing and isolation, to eliminate the COVID-19 local outbreaks almost as soon as they started, avoiding the two or three great waves of exponential growth of the epidemic which have plagued most countries in the West. Historical reasons such as the large exposition to other great epidemics (SARS, swine flu and MERS), contributed to better planning and prevention and to the strategy of maintaining more hospital beds for 1000 inhabitants in Japan and South Korea. Less individualism and more attention to collectivity contributed to the traditional habit of wearing masks and to respect the directions of health authorities and experts more. Less arrogance of political leaders and more courage towards myopic interest groups contributed to act more readily and severely in restricted zones, and so to reduce the heavy social and economic consequences of long and generalized lockdowns as it occurred in most Western countries.
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